Student Loans in Bankruptcy and the  Undue Hardship  Exception: Who Should Foot the Bill? by Grant, Kyle L.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2011 | Issue 3 Article 10
9-1-2011
Student Loans in Bankruptcy and the "Undue
Hardship" Exception: Who Should Foot the Bill?
Kyle L. Grant
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Education Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kyle L. Grant, Student Loans in Bankruptcy and the "Undue Hardship" Exception: Who Should Foot the Bill?, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 819
(2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2011/iss3/10
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013 3:50 PM 
 
819 
Student Loans in Bankruptcy and the “Undue Hardship” 
Exception: Who Should Foot the Bill? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the fundamental characteristics of the American dream is that 
anyone should have the opportunity to get an education regardless of 
their ability to pay the cost. The Federal Student Loan Program started as 
a small allocation from the Department of Education to guarantee private 
loans in those exceptional cases where a person wanted to attend college 
but lacked the means to pay and the credit to obtain financing. Today, the 
Federal Student Loan Program accounts for more than half of the 
revenue produced in many higher educational institutions, making 
student loans a staple of American education. In public universities, 62% 
of students graduated with some kind of student debt; that number was 
72% at private universities, and at the increasingly popular for-profit 
universities—where tuition rates are among the highest in the nation—it 
was a whopping 96%.1 Along with this rise in federal funding and 
student loan guarantees, default rates skyrocketed as well, forcing many 
to seek the protection of bankruptcy to avoid mounting debts.2 As it turns 
out, the winning state for the most student debt is Arizona, home to the 
largest for-profit educational institution, the University of Phoenix.3  
It’s no secret: educational loans put students, as well as lenders, in a 
precarious position. There is no guarantee of employment for the student 
after graduation and no collateral for the lender. When the federal 
government started guaranteeing student loans, these loans were treated 
like any other kind of debt that could be discharged in bankruptcy. But in 
1978, Congress began to withdraw such bankruptcy protection unless 
repayment of the loan would present an “undue hardship.”4 This Act has 
incurred substantial criticism over the years for apparently being at odds 
with the overall goal of the Bankruptcy Code to provide a “fresh start” 
 
 1. The Inst. for Coll. Access & Success, Quick Facts About Student Debt, THE PROJECT ON 
STUDENT DEBT (Jan. 2010), http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/File /Debt_Facts_and_Sources.pdf. 
 2. Hibah Yousuf, Student Loan Default Rate Creeps Higher, CNNMONEY.COM (Sept. 13, 
2010, 11:47 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/13/pf/college 
/student_loan_default_rate/index.htm.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2591 (codified at 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006)).  
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for the unfortunate debtor.5 Lenders contend that because there is no 
collateral to secure the loan, they need some kind of protection in order 
to provide other students with lower interest rates. As a result, taxpayers 
would ultimately have to foot the bill when the government ends up with 
a large number of defaulted loans. With debtors, lenders, other students, 
and taxpayers playing a game of musical chairs, someone is inevitably 
going to end up without a chair and be unfairly forced to bear the cost.  
The scholarly treatment of the “undue hardship” exception has been 
largely negative; scholars have argued either for a more lenient reading 
of § 523(a)(8) or for its repeal altogether.6 This Comment argues that 
there are legitimate reasons in support of a strict, uniform interpretation 
of “undue hardship” according to its plain language and the clear intent 
of Congress. While one underlying purpose of bankruptcy law is to 
provide a “fresh start” for certain qualified debtors, Congress has chosen 
to diverge from that policy in dealing with student loans, and for good 
reason. The results may be harsh, but they are not absurd. As more 
debtors receive such harsh treatment in the courts, Congress may be 
forced to reconsider the issue. As a result, Congress could restore equal 
protection for student loan defaulters, just as the Bankruptcy Code does 
for other debtors. Alternatively, Congress could preserve the current 
approach but turn its attention to the universities themselves, requiring 
them to truthfully educate prospective students about the risks of student 
loans and the reality of employment prospects upon graduation. 
Part II provides an overview of the bankruptcy system, the 
development of student loans in the United States, and the policies 
underlying § 523(a)(8) and its approach to student loans. Part III reviews 
how various courts have interpreted and applied the “undue hardship” 
exception in the student loan context. Part IV provides an analysis of 
these approaches, arguing that a strict implementation of the “undue 
hardship” exception is the best approach. Part V then offers a brief 
conclusion. 
 
 5. See, e.g., Richard Fossey, “The Certainty of Hopelessness”: Are Courts Too Harsh 
Toward Bankrupt Student Loan Debtors?, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 29, 33 (1997); B.J. Huey, Comment, 
Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time Finally Arrived for Congress to Discharge Section 
523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 89, 116 (2003).  
 6. See, e.g., Sarah Edstrom Smith, Should the Eighth Circuit Continue to Be the Loan 
Ranger? A Look at the Totality of the Circumstances Test for Discharging Student Loans Under the 
Undue Hardship Exception in Bankruptcy, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 601, 616–18 (2006); Huey, supra 
note 5. 
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II. THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM AND STUDENT LOANS 
In order to fully explain the reasons supporting a strict interpretation 
of “undue hardship,” this Part will provide an overview of the 
bankruptcy system, along with a brief history of the development of 
student loans in the United States, followed by the policy considerations 
underlying the enactment of § 523(a)(8) and its unique treatment of 
student loans. Any argument on the subject of exceptions to discharge is 
incomplete without a full understanding of the options available in 
bankruptcy. In particular, it should be noted at the outset that a discharge 
of debt is not always the debtor’s only goal in bankruptcy.7  
A. Bankruptcy Law 
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to establish 
uniform bankruptcy laws.8 Congress has exercised this power to 
establish a separate judicial department of the federal district courts to 
administer the bankruptcy system.9 The first permanent legislation on 
uniform bankruptcy laws was the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.10 Since then, 
there have been major reforms to the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, 1990, 
1998, and 2005.11 As it stands today, the Bankruptcy Code offers the 
financially troubled individual the option of obtaining relief from 
creditors in the form of Chapter 7 liquidation12 or a Chapter 13 
adjustment of debts for debtors who have adequate income to repay all or 
part of the debts through a repayment plan.13 Under both chapters, the 
goal of almost every debtor is typically the “discharge” of debts,14 which 
enjoins any act by creditors to collect the discharged debt.15 While 
discharge is most often the debtor’s goal, the creditor’s goal is typically 
to obtain a denial of the debtor’s discharge altogether, or—even better—
an exception from discharge for that creditor’s particular claim on the 
 
 7.  See infra note 19 and accompanying text. In Chapter 13 cases, for instance, the debtor’s 
goal is not always to obtain a discharge, but to structure a repayment plan that the debtor can fulfill 
while enjoying the benefits of the automatic stay against creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  
 8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 151.  
 10. 30 Stat. 544. 
 11. See Huey, supra note 5, at 93–95.  
 12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–727.  
 13. Id. §§ 1301–1330.  
 14. Id. §§ 727(a), 1328(a).  
 15. Id. § 524(a)(1)–(3); In re Olson, 38 B.R. 515, 518 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (holding that 
a doctor’s refusal to provide medical services until pre-petition discharged debts were paid violated 
the discharge injunction).  
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debtor.  
This Comment focuses on the exception provided in  
§ 523(a)(8), which states: 
(a) A discharge under . . . this title does not discharge an individual 
debtor from any debt—  
(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph 
would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s 
dependents, for— 
(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or 
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded 
in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or 
(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, 
scholarship, or stipend; or 
(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan . . . 
incurred by a debtor who is an individual . . . .16 
To clarify, the debtor generally will receive a discharge of debts unless 
any of his debts are listed in § 523(a). If a particular debt, such as an 
educational loan, is listed in § 523(a), that debt is an “exception” to the 
possibility of discharge and will have to be paid. The “undue hardship” 
clause is therefore an exception to the student loan exception, in that if 
the debtor can show that repaying the debt  
would impose an undue hardship, the debt will then be discharged like 
all other debts generally.  
The Supreme Court has stated that § 523(a)(8) is self-executing, 
meaning that “[u]nless the debtor affirmatively secures a hardship 
determination, the discharge order will not include a student loan 
debt.”17 This brings up another point: discharge is not always the goal of 
bankruptcy. A debtor who carries both educational debt and consumer 
debt can first obtain a discharge of the consumer debt in a Chapter 7 
liquidation within a matter of months.18 The student debt will survive 
this bankruptcy, and then the debtor can more easily manage his student 
loan in a Chapter 13 repayment plan over the course of three to five 
 
 16. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (emphasis added). A “qualified education loan” is defined under 
the Internal Revenue Code as any education loan to pay expenses while a student is enrolled in at 
least half the normal full-time student load; it does not include loans between family members or 
loans made under an employment contract. 26 U.S.C. § 221(d)(1).  
 17. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 450 (2004).  
 18. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)–(b). 
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years.19 
Analysis of any bankruptcy problem and, particularly a problem 
arising in the educational loan context, begins with the two aims of the 
bankruptcy system: 1) to provide “equality of distribution”20 to creditors 
and 2) to give a “‘fresh start’” for the “‘honest but unfortunate 
debtor.’”21 While the phrase “fresh start” does not show up in the 
Bankruptcy Code, it is an accepted policy of the bankruptcy system and 
the clear purpose underlying discharge in bankruptcy.22 Commentators 
often invoke this “fresh start” policy as a controlling and mandatory 
standard by which bankruptcy law must be tailored.23 But Congress is 
under no obligation, constitutional or otherwise, to enact uniform laws on 
bankruptcy that operate under the “fresh start” policy, or any other 
policy.24 Rather, Congress is free to structure bankruptcy law in any way 
that may protect the needs of the poor, unfortunate debtor, or favor the 
business interests of creditors. For better or worse, over the last thirty 
years Congress  
 
has favored the latter in dealing with the problem of student debt 
discharge.25  
B. The Federal Student Loan Program 
When the Soviet Union put Sputnik into orbit, Congress decided that 
it was time to put America back in school. As a result, in 1958 it enacted 
the National Defense Education Act, which established the predecessor 
to the Perkins Loan Program and allowed students to obtain student loans 
 
 19. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a), (d). This method is often called a “Chapter 20” filing (Chapter 7 
plus Chapter 13). The 2005 amendment in BAPCPA restricted the availability of this option by 
placing timing restrictions between filings.  
 20. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 346 (1874). 
 21. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 
U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating that the Bankruptcy Act “gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . 
a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and 
discouragement of pre-existing debt”)). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See, e.g., Fossey, supra note 5, at 33; Robert F. Salvin, Student Loans, Bankruptcy, and 
the Fresh Start Policy: Must Debtors Be Impoverished to Discharge Educational Loans?, 71 TUL. L. 
REV. 139, 173–78 (1996); Huey, supra note 5, at 93. 
 24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.; In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 753 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).  
 25. In 1978, Congress had conflicting information about how many students were actually 
abusing the bankruptcy system to discharge student loans on the eve of lucrative careers, but 
Congress nevertheless enacted § 523(a)(8). See Huey, supra note 5, at 98. 
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from the government at five percent interest.26 Congress later established 
a program in 1965 allowing the government to guarantee private loans, 
which later was named the Stafford Loan Program.27 These loan 
programs were originally open only to those individuals able to 
demonstrate financial difficulty in paying for college, but in 1978, 
Congress opened the door further and made federally guaranteed loans 
available to virtually all students without regard to financial need.28 
Because of this universal availability, maintaining the solvency of 
the Federal Student Loan Program is vital to higher education. Robert C. 
Cloud, Ed.D., identified two reasons why this is the case: “First, millions 
of deserving students depend on federal loans to finance their educations. 
Second, most institutions, both public and private, could not survive 
financially without the revenue generated through the federal loan 
program.”29 Thus, it is important that educational loans remain easy for 
students to obtain. However, as long as financing remains the primary 
revenue generator, universities will continue to raise their tuition.30 One 
commentator described (with appropriate imagery) the situation as 
follows: “Colleges ‘suddenly saw the government as this giant wobbling 
teat just waiting to be sucked and started a spastic race towards Who 
Could Charge the Most Ludicrous Tuition for Four Years . . . .’”31 These 
practices have continued up to the present time. Today, the average cost 
of tuition at public universities is over $7,000 per year, while private 
universities charge, on average, over $27,000 per year.32 Off to the races 
they went, and there is no sign that anyone is getting tired: universities 
have consistently raised their tuition above the inflation rate for the last 
thirty years.33 With such heavy dependence on the Federal Student Loan 
 
 26. Robert C. Cloud, When Does Repaying a Student Loan Become an Undue Hardship?, 
185 EDUC. L. REP. 783, 786–87 (2004).  
 27. Id. at 787.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 788. 
 30. See, e.g., Kim Clark, College Tuition Prices Continue to Rise, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, Oct. 23, 2007, http://www.usnews.com/education/paying-for-college/articles 
/2007/10/23/college-tuition-prices-continue-to-rise.html; Editorial, Fees or Tuition, It’s Too Much, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/10 /opinion/la-ed-tuition-20101110.  
 31. Roger Roots, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A Lesson in Unintended Consequences, 29 
SW. U. L. REV. 501, 506 n.23 (2000) (quoting Ian William, The Indentured Class: Student Loans Are 
Robbing Us of Our Future, THE PROVIDENCE PHOENIX, Sept. 20, 1996, at 8). 
 32. COLLEGE BOARD ADVOCACY & POLICY CENTER, TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
SERIES: TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2010 10 (2010), available at 
http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/College_Pricing_2010.pdf.  
 33. Id. at 13.  
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013 3:50 PM 
819 Student Loans in Bankruptcy 
 825 
Program, and the general push for students to attend college, student debt 
is here to stay. 
C. Policy of the “Undue Hardship” Exception 
There is much controversy today over the “undue hardship” 
exception, a great deal of which is reflected in the historical debate in 
Congress that occurred when it considered enacting § 523(a)(8). In 1978, 
the same year that federal loans were opened to most middle class 
Americans without the requirement that students demonstrate financial 
need, Congress added the § 523(a)(8) “undue hardship” exception to the 
Bankruptcy Code. This was a response to the fear that students might 
take advantage of the bankruptcy system by incurring large amounts of 
student debt, only to obtain a discharge of the debt on the eve of lucrative 
careers.34 Proponents responded, however, that if the “undue hardship” 
rule was repealed or interpreted too leniently, the Federal Student Loan 
Program could collapse and lenders would refuse to loan to high-credit-
risk students. The loss from defaults would fall on taxpayers. Other 
student debtors would also bear the burden of defaults through higher 
interest rates, and some students would not even be able to qualify for a 
loan because of the credit risk.  
Democratic Representative Allen E. Ertel, who advocated the 
inclusion of § 523(a)(8), argued further: “At a time when political, 
business, and social morality are major issues, it is dangerous to enact a 
law that is almost specifically designed to encourage fraud.”35 Thus, it 
does not matter whether the bankruptcy system is actually being abused 
because educational debt is treated like any other debt; the real problem 
lies in offering the temptation. Indeed, just because student debtors 
historically have not taken advantage of the bankruptcy system does not 
mean that they would not do so now if given the opportunity. Perhaps 
such abuse has never existed precisely because Congress has never 
afforded the broad population of students the opportunity to discharge 
 
 34. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 536–537 (1977). 
 35. Id. at 536–37 (“For example, as a student leaves college to find a job, that student would 
have two options: (1) repay a substantial loan at a time when that student’s financial situation is 
probably at its lowest, or (2) discharge the debt in bankruptcy, having received the benefit of a free 
education. If student A elects to repay the loan, honoring the legal and moral obligation that was 
incurred, he begins his career with a substantial debt and the accompanying financial pressure. 
Meanwhile, student B (who chooses to declare bankruptcy) can begin with a clean slate and is free to 
spend his initial earnings on other items. By combining the clean slate with the excellent credit 
rating that accompanies a bankruptcy (since the discharge debtor cannot declare bankruptcy again 
for six years), student B is rewarded for refusing to honor a legal obligation.”).  
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student loans without a showing of “undue hardship.”  
Moreover, proponents of the “undue hardship” provision argued that 
a student loan is fundamentally distinct from other more traditional types 
of loans. Lending in the student loan context is increasingly based on and 
driven by risk. With a home loan, this risk is mitigated by the fact that 
there is property securing the debt. But the student is not a typical debtor, 
but rather a newcomer in society. She generally has no assets by which 
any debt could be secured, and she is often a poor credit risk. The 
education that the student seeks is not a transferable asset, and so the 
student essentially mortgages the only thing possible: her future earnings 
without the possibility of relief from bankruptcy. This trade-off, 
proponents argue, is what allows students to obtain financing on such 
relatively favorable terms. 
Opponents in Congress pointed out that the empirical data did not 
suggest that discharges of student loans in bankruptcy were a problem, 
even if high default rates were problematic for the federal loan 
program.36 In 1978, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) found 
that the default rate on education loans was 18%, and of those 18%, only 
about 3–4% received a discharge in bankruptcy.37 The GAO also found 
that in most bankruptcy cases involving student debtors, the educational 
loans accounted for only a part of the debtor’s total indebtedness, 
demonstrating that most student debtors were in bankruptcy as a result of 
“a true need for . . . relief rather than an abuse of the bankruptcy 
system.”38 Moreover, they reasoned that “[t]reating students, all students, 
as though they were suspected frauds and felons is no substitute for 
improving the administration of the (student loan) program.”39 In sum, 
opponents argued that the alleged abuse was more perceived than real, 
possibly because of exaggeration by the media, which created public 
concern that potentially devious students would take advantage of a 
bankruptcy loophole.40  
In the present debate today, commentators who oppose  § 523(a)(8) 
argue that the “undue hardship” rule is unnecessarily harsh, denying debt 
relief to all but a few select debtors, and usually only to those with 
 
 36. Id. at 133 (letter of comptroller general Elmer B. Staats). 
 37. Id. at 121. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
 40. See Huey, supra note 5, at 97 n.84 (citing Jean Seligman et al., Study Now, Pay Never, 
NEWSWEEK, May 7, 1977, at 95). 
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dependents and medical conditions that prevent gainful employment.41 
At the same time, debtors with other kinds of debt are not laden with the 
task of proving undue hardship. This problem is compounded because 
courts have developed varying standards, and the subsequent lack of 
uniformity prevents student debtors from knowing beforehand if they 
might qualify for undue hardship.  
Today, along with the ever-increasing cost of tuition, the student 
loan default rate has risen as well. In a 2010 press release, U.S. Secretary 
of Education Arne Duncan announced that the average default rate in 
2008 was 7%, with public universities suffering a default rate of 6%; 
private universities, 4%; and for-profit universities, 11.6%.42 Duncan 
went on to say, 
This data confirms what we already know: that many students are 
struggling to pay back their student loans during very difficult 
economic times. . . . While for-profit schools have profited and 
prospered thanks to federal dollars, some of their students have not. Far 
too many for-profit schools are saddling students with debt they cannot 
afford in exchange for degrees and certificates they cannot use. This is 
a disservice to students and taxpayers . . . .43 
There are arguments that cut both ways, but in the end, Congress had 
a legitimate reason for deviating from the “fresh start” policy that 
generally guides bankruptcy law. That policy was the potential abuse that 
could occur if students were allowed to discharge their educational loans 
in bankruptcy the same way that other debts are discharged. Students 
generally do not have the volume of assets that other debtors have, and a 
student’s education cannot be liquidated like real or personal property in 
order to satisfy the creditors’ claims. While many commentators have 
criticized the enactment of § 523(a)(8) as a response to a merely 
“perceived” problem rather than an actual one,44 Congress was probably 
most concerned with the potential for abuse, perceived or actual, that 
could undermine the Federal Student Loan Program, shift the costs of 
defaults to the taxpayers, and burden future student borrowers with 
higher interest rates and less favorable loan terms. These policies are 
anything but obsolete today; if anything, there is an even stronger policy 
 
 41. See, e.g., id. at 115–18. 
 42. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Student Loan Default Rates Increase, (Sept. 13, 
2010), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/student-loan-default-rates-increase-0. 
 43. Id. 
 44. E.g., Kurt Wiese, Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy: The Bankruptcy Court Tests 
of “Undue Hardship,” 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 446 (1984).  
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supporting tighter standards on student loans in bankruptcy as tuition and 
default rates increase.  
Furthermore, even if a student cannot receive a discharge in 
bankruptcy, this is not the end of the analysis—the student has other 
remedies. First, the unavailability of discharge does not mean that the 
student cannot still file a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 in 
order to establish a repayment plan.45 Still, more remedies are available 
to the student through federal programs that allow the student to repay, 
such as “income-contingent repayment” and “extended repayment.”46  
Finally, Congress shows little sign that it has any intention of 
repealing the “undue hardship” exception in spite of strong opposition. A 
review of the history of § 523(a)(8) is revealing on this point. When first 
enacted in 1978, § 523(a)(8) provided that student loans were 
dischargeable only in the first five years after becoming due.
47
 
Furthermore, education loans were excepted from discharge only in 
Chapter 7 liquidation cases, not in Chapter 13 adjustment of debt cases.48 
In 1990, Congress amended the “undue hardship” exception so that 
educational loans could no longer be discharged in Chapter 13 cases.49 In 
the same year, Congress extended the five-year exception period to seven 
years.50 These amendments came at the precise time when student 
borrowing began to increase at greater rates.51 In 1998, Congress 
repealed the seven-year exceptions, forcing the financially troubled 
student to prove undue hardship no matter how long it had been since the 
time the loan became due.52 At this point, it was clear that this “pattern 
of amendment represents an obvious tendency on the part of Congress to 
tighten the gaps through which students could avoid loan repayment.”53  
With the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (BAPCPA) overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress 
had the opportunity to remove or restrict the application of § 523(a)(8), 
 
 45. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2006). 
 46. See Solutions for Borrowers Who Are Having Trouble Repaying Education Loans, 
FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/troublerepayingdebt.phtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). 
 47. Huey, supra note 5, at 100 (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-508, § 3007(b), 104 Stat. 1388–28 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a))).  
  48.  Id. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. 
 51. See Cloud, supra note 26, at 788.  
 52. Huey, supra note 5, at 101 (citing Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105–244, 112 Stat. 1837 (1998)).  
 53. Kapinos v. Graduate Loan Ctr., 243 B.R. 271, 276 (W.D. Va. 2000). 
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but chose not to do so. In fact, it expanded the exception even further. 
Prior to 2005, the “undue hardship” exception applied only to loans 
“insured, or guaranteed by a government unit, or made under any 
program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit 
institution.”54 With the enactment of BAPCPA, Congress once again 
amended § 523(a)(8) and brought within the ambit of the “undue 
hardship” exception “any other education loan that is a qualified 
education loan.”55 The direction of Congressional action in the last thirty 
years with regards to educational loans has made abundantly clear 
Congress’s intent that educational loans be discharged only in very 
unusual circumstances. 
III. COURT-MADE “UNDUE HARDSHIP” TESTS 
Whatever the considerations that led Congress to adopt the “undue 
hardship” exception, Congress left “undue hardship” undefined. As a 
result, federal courts have come up with several different tests to 
determine when an “undue hardship” exists. Some of the earliest 
decisions over educational debt discharge first attempted a definitional 
approach to “undue hardship” by looking at the dictionary definition of 
“undue.”56 One district court concluded that “undue” meant 
“inappropriate or unsuitable or not right and not extraordinary” and did 
not require “exceptional circumstances.”57 This approach was short-
lived, and unsurprisingly did nothing to clear up the confusion over what 
constituted an “undue hardship.”58 Because of this confusion, courts 
began to adopt more uniform standards to determine when an “undue 
hardship” existed.  
A. The Johnson Test: The Mechanical Approach 
In the wake of the confusion left by the definitional approach to 
“undue hardship,” the Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court in In re Johnson 
set the first mechanical approach for interpreting “undue hardship.”59 
The opinion first quoted a report of the Bankruptcy Commission from 
 
 54. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(i) (2000).  
 55. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2006). 
 56. In re Johnson, No. 77-2033 TT, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *20 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1979) (citing In re Moore, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 791, 792 (W.D.N.Y. 1978)).  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at *21.  
 59. Id. at *21–23. 
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1973 when the idea of an “undue hardship” exception was first 
introduced: 
In order to determine whether nondischargeability of the debt will 
impose an “undue hardship” on the debtor, the rate and amount of his 
future resources should be estimated reasonably in terms of ability to 
obtain, retain, and continue employment and the rate of pay that can be 
expected. Any unearned income or other wealth which the debtor can 
be expected to receive should also be taken into account.60 
The court created a test whereby the debtor’s past and future income 
and expenses are compared to determine whether the debtor has the 
ability to pay while maintaining a “minimal living standard.”61 The court 
set forth a complicated list of factors to consider, such as rate of pay, 
ability to obtain and retain employment, skills, sex (in cases where the 
debtor is a woman trying to obtain employment), current employment 
status, employment record, education, health, access to transportation, 
and whether the debtor has dependents.62 Then the court adopted a two-
part test for determining the amount of an individual’s expenses. First, 
the court determines “what amount of monthly expenses is reasonable for 
a ‘similarly situated hypothetical debtor.’”63 Second, the court adds to 
this amount any “extraordinary expenses.”64 The court then identified 
three factors to guide courts in determining whether the first prong is 
satisfied.65 As should be obvious at this point, the mechanical aspect of 
the Johnson test was rather complicated and difficult to apply. There are 
multiple prongs with multiple factors, which themselves breed more 
factors and more prongs, rendering the litigation too burdensome.66 
However, the Johnson test became the predecessor to the Brunner test, 
discussed in Subpart C below.  
If the debtor was able to make it through the gauntlet of the 
mechanical test, the court would then look to see if the debtor had made 
 
 60. Id. at *21–22 (quoting COMMUNICATION FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMMISSION 
ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING A REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 140 
n.17 (1973)).  
 61. Id. at *21–23. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. The three factors are 1) marital status, 2) number of dependents, and 3) whether any 
necessities are furnished in kind, or at reduced cost. Id. at *32. 
 66. Smith, supra note 6, at 616–18.  
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good faith efforts to repay the loan.67 In order to do this, the court 
assesses whether the debtor was negligent or irresponsible in maximizing 
income, minimizing expenses, and making efforts to obtain 
employment.68 For instance, if the debtor had an opportunity to find a 
residence at half the rent the debtor was currently paying, then the debtor 
was negligent in minimizing living expenses.69 Moreover, if the debtor 
failed to seek gainful employment, a court would likewise be justified in 
denying the debtor’s discharge.70  
Additionally (since the two-part test apparently was not enough), the 
court added a third part: a policy analysis focusing on the amount of 
educational debt, the percentage of the debtor’s total indebtedness, which 
is composed of student loans, and the extent to which the debtor’s 
education has enhanced earning capacity.71 Essentially, the court looks 
to the motives of the debtor, asking why the debtor filed bankruptcy and 
whether the debtor is trying to take advantage of the system.72 If a debtor 
satisfies the mechanical test but fails the good faith test, the court may 
grant a discharge based on the policy test.73 
Naturally, the results of the Johnson test were harsh because too 
many elements had to be proven, and the debtor largely carried the 
burden of proof.74 Furthermore, the test is simply too convoluted to be of 
any value to other courts, let alone to debtors who must know whether 
they can satisfy the elements of the test.75 
B. The Bryant Test: The Objective Approach 
The same court (in a case involving the same party) developed a new 
test eight years later in Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Education 
 
 67. In re Johnson, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *41. 
 68. Id. at *44–50. 
 69. Id. at *45. 
 70. Id. at *47. 
 71. Id. at *52. The court quoted from Bankruptcy Revision Hearings supporting such a policy 
analysis that comported with the policies discussed above in Part II.B.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. See id.; Huey, supra note 5, at 104.  
 75. Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 915 n.2 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (“In the leading case on this issue arising in this Court, In re Johnson, Chief 
Judge Twardowski develops a comprehensive and thoughtful, but unfortunately complicated three-
part progressive test, each level of which has numerous inquiries to be answered before proceeding 
to the next level. While we find the Johnson Opinion very helpful in cataloging circumstances which 
can be considered by courts in such matters, we respectfully decline to follow the Johnson test.” 
(internal citation omitted)).  
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Assistance Agency.76 In an attempt to “place the element of objectivity 
into the process of decision-making in this area,”77 the court adopted a 
test which first analyzes the income and resources of the debtor in 
relation to the poverty guidelines.78 If the debtor’s income is below or 
close to the poverty line a presumption of dischargeability arises.79 
However, if the debtor’s income is substantially above the poverty line, 
such a presumption is not warranted, although the debtor can still 
demonstrate “unique” and “extraordinary” circumstances which should 
nevertheless render the debt dischargeable.80 Like the court in Johnson, 
the court in Bryant placed emphasis on the phrase “minimal standard of 
living” as utilized in the Bankruptcy Commission Report.81 The court 
recognized that “poverty level” and “minimal living standard” are 
probably two different things.82 While it is unclear what exactly is meant 
by “minimal standard of living,” the court felt that if a debtor was below 
the “poverty level,” the debtor was certainly below the “minimal 
standard of living.”83 For this reason, the court created an ipso facto 
presumption that satisfying the “poverty level” test automatically 
establishes “undue hardship.”84 In a further attempt to add objectivity to 
the test, the court held that the federal poverty guidelines should be used 
in making this determination.85 However, one problem remained: what is 
meant by the phrase “substantially over” the poverty line? Unfortunately, 
the court never adequately explained this.86 In analyzing whether 
“unique” and “extraordinary” circumstances existed, the court looked to 
the totality of the circumstances.87 
The court conceded that although the test was harsh,  § 523(a)(8) 
applied only to debtors in Chapter 7 cases, and not those in Chapter 13 
cases. This fact led the court to conclude that its “poverty line” test was 
 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 915.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93–137 at 140, 141 app. 2 (1973)).  
 82. Id. at 916.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 918.  
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not overly strict.88 Additionally, the court rejected any notion that the 
motives of the debtor should be taken into consideration in determining 
discharge.89 
In applying the newly created test to Bryant, one of the debtors in the 
case, the court found that even though the debtor did not satisfy the 
poverty level test, he did satisfy the totality of the circumstances test, in 
part because he was a recent law graduate who had failed to pass the bar 
five times.90 The result comported with the policies underlying the 
“undue hardship” exception, since originally Congress would have been 
concerned about students’ ability to declare bankruptcy on the “eve of a 
lucrative career.”91 Here, the unusual circumstances existed where a 
debtor was not trying to take advantage of the bankruptcy system, but 
rather was simply involved in a difficult situation that he was unable to 
remedy. On the other hand, one could argue that the debtor should not 
have been relieved of his burden when it was his decision to enter law 
school and assume a large debt. Wasn’t this the risk that the debtor 
undertook when he obtained the financing to attend school? In this way, 
the totality of the circumstances test, as will be discussed below in Part 
IV.D, is inappropriate because it does not comport with the legislative 
intent of § 523(a)(8).92  
C. The Brunner Test: The Majority Rule 
The “undue hardship” test used by a majority of courts is derived 
from the case of Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services 
Corp.93 Instead of using a test comprised of alternative elements, the 
district court developed a single three-part test, in which each element is 
necessary to establish “undue hardship.” The debtor must prove that 1) 
the debtor cannot, based on current income and expenses, maintain a 
 
 88. Id. at 917.  
 89. Id. at 915 n.2.(“[W]e disagree with the attachment of any significance to the factor set 
forth in the first part of the Johnson ‘policy test,’ in which the court considers the amount and 
percentage of student loan indebtedness to all of the debtor's indebtedness in the bankruptcy, in order 
to determine whether the dominant purpose of the bankruptcy was to discharge the student loan. In 
In re Gathright, we observed that avoiding the consequences of debts is normally the reason for 
filing for bankruptcy and the fact that the Debtor seeks to discharge almost exclusively student loan 
obligations in his bankruptcy should be irrelevant. We believe that this factor should likewise be 
entirely irrelevant in a § 523(a)(8)(B) analysis.”). 
 90. Id. at 926.  
 91. In re Andresen, 232 B.R. 127, 130 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999). 
 92. See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
 93. 46 B.R. 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d. Cir. 1987).  
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“minimal standard of living” if forced to repay, 2) “additional 
circumstances” exist indicating that the debtor’s current condition will 
continue for a significant portion of the repayment period, and 3) the 
debtor has made a “good faith” effort to repay the loan.94 In this case, the 
debtor received a master’s degree in social work, incurring a total of 
$9,000 in student debt, and then filed for bankruptcy about seven months 
later.95 The debtor was unable to find work, had no dependents, and was 
living primarily off of welfare for the four months prior to her 
bankruptcy filing.96 She offered testimony from her therapist that she 
suffered from depression due to her unemployment, but that she was still 
able to work.97 Moreover, she had sent out over a hundred resumes to 
employers in her field but was unsuccessful, as were many in her field in 
the early 1980s.98 The court conceded that the debtor clearly did not 
have the ability to repay her student loans and at the same time maintain 
a minimal living standard.99 However, the debtor failed to show that her 
circumstances would continue into the foreseeable future since she did 
not have a “psychological impairment,”100 and was “apparently healthy, 
presumably intelligent, and well-educated.”101  
The debtor’s situation in Brunner is a typical one: the debtor is 
usually able to show that paying off the debt while maintaining a 
minimal living standard would be impossible.102 However, the debtor 
will face a far more difficult task in proving that this inability to pay will 
continue into the future. A bankruptcy judge in the same circuit that 
decided Brunner stated that “dischargeability of student loans should be 
based upon the certainty of hopelessness, not simply a present inability to 
fulfill financial obligations.”103 This “certainty of hopelessness” standard 
has been the staple of virtually all undue hardship analysis.104 But, as 
 
 94. Id. at 754–57.  
 95. Id. at 754. 
 96. Id. at 757.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. The bankruptcy court judge found that the debtor did in fact have a psychological 
impairment. See id. However, the district court determined this finding to be clearly erroneous since, 
although the debtor may have suffered from depression, such a condition did not impair her ability to 
work.  
 101. Id.  
 102. See, e.g., In re Hinkle, 200 B.R. 690 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1996) (holding that a fifty-one-
year-old woman with a degree and a steady income was entitled to an “undue hardship” discharge).  
 103. Id. at 755 (quoting In re Briscoe, 16 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)).  
 104. Fossey, supra note 5, at 30 (citing Commonwealth State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. 
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one commentator notes, it is “an almost impossible burden to 
overcome.”105 The reason for this is that “[t]hose debtors who are in the 
most dire need of relief—that is, those for whom repayment will 
certainly impose an undue hardship—will likely lack the resources to 
pursue such relief in the first instance.”106 
D. The Totality of the Circumstances Test 
Some courts have criticized the use of a mechanical test, such as the 
Johnson or Brunner tests, and instead have adopted a “totality of the 
circumstances” test. The Eighth Circuit adopted the totality of the 
circumstances test in the case of Andrews v. South Dakota Loan 
Assistance Corp. In this case, the court reasoned that all circumstances 
surrounding the debtor’s situation should be considered, particularly 
because the policy underlying bankruptcy relief is equity, which requires 
more of an in-depth factual analysis than a purely legal one.107 Under 
this test, a court is free to consider any fact that may bear on the debtor’s 
case in addition to those already considered in the mechanical tests.108 
Because of this freedom to consider any factor relevant to the debtor’s 
case, commentators have praised the inherent flexibility of the test.109 
One commentator argued, “As tuition rates continue to rise, students 
continue to take out more student loans. . . . The test provides a look at 
the debtor’s whole financial situation and still provides for the 
 
Dillon, 189 B.R. 382 (W.D. Va. 1995); In re Coveney, 192 B.R. 140 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996); In re 
Walcott, 185 B.R. 721 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1995); In re Garrett, 180 B.R. 358 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1995); 
In re Mathews, 166 B.R. 940 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1994)).  
 105. Huey, supra note 5, at 116.  
 106. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship 
Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 191 (citing NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, 
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 212 (1997) (“It hardly is surprising that some courts see 
few requests for hardship discharges of educational loans given the pitfalls of the undue hardship 
standard. The borrowers most likely to prevail in many courts are those with the least possibility of 
being able to litigate the question. The risk of losing is also high. Failure to meet the burden of proof 
leaves the debtor with student loan debts and substantial litigation expenses.”)).  
 107. See Moorman v. Ky. Higher Educ. Assistance Auth., 44 B.R. 135, 137–38 (Bankr. W.D. 
Ky. 1984) (“‘Undue hardship’ is a concept so fraught with subjective elements that we must consider 
the totality of a debtor's circumstances to confirm its presence or absence. . . . Our approach is not 
intended to yield a general rule applicable to a broad class of cases, but remains as flexible and 
adaptable as the concept of equity itself. We are able to say only that the whole of a debtor’s 
condition, in an undue hardship case, should be sufficient to strike a chord of pity in the heart of 
equity.”).  
 108. See  Cloud, supra note 26, at 797.  
 109. See Smith, supra note 6, at 632–33; Jennifer Frattini, Comment, The Dischargeability of 
Student Loans: An Undue Burden?, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 537, 572 (2001).  
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consideration of other facts and circumstances.”110 
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VARIOUS STANDARDS 
Now that the various tests have been outlined, this Part will analyze 
the various ingredients that have been used in these tests. Up to this 
point, the courts have attempted to concoct the perfect recipe that 
balances both the needs of unfortunate debtors and the stability of the 
federal student loan program. The relevant factors include 1) the poverty 
level/minimal living standard with the “additional circumstances” test, 2) 
the good faith standard, 3) the motivation standard, and 4) the totality of 
the circumstances approach. As stated, this Comment proposes a 
modified test based on the Brunner test. 
A. Living Standard: Analysis of Income and Expenses 
Virtually all courts have accepted that the determination of the 
debtor’s income relative to the minimal living standard is a necessary 
element of the analysis.111 First, the Bankruptcy Commission that 
initially recommended the inclusion of § 523(a)(8) expressly referenced 
the requirement that debtors show that repayment of the debt will prevent 
the debtor from maintaining a minimal living standard.112 The Ninth 
Circuit has interpreted the first element in this way:  
To meet this requirement, the debtor must demonstrate more than 
simply tight finances. In defining undue hardship, courts require more 
than temporary financial adversity, but typically stop short of utter 
hopelessness. The proper inquiry is whether it would be 
“unconscionable” to require the debtor to take steps to earn more 
income or reduce her expenses.113  
In other words, the debtor need not show that she is in poverty, but 
mere financial difficulty is not enough. Under the Ninth Circuit 
interpretation, the court is free to make an individualized analysis of the 
debtor’s income and expenses and may also consider past fluctuations in 
income to produce an accurate picture of the debtor’s real financial 
 
 110. Smith, supra note 6, at 633, 635.  
 111. See, e.g., In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 
1987); In re Bryant, 72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Johnson, No. 77-2033 TT, 1979 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 11428 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979). 
 112. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 754.  
 113. In re Birrane, 287 B.R. 490, 495 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (citing In re 
Nascimento, 241 B.R. 440, 445 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999)). 
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situation.114 However, this interpretation allows courts to “infuse 
subjectivity into what should be a straightforward financial 
calculation.”115 The main criticism is that this infused subjectivity will 
lead to inconsistent results,116 but the results would likely be no more 
varied than the results of other types of analyses, such as those of 
unconscionability in contract law or reasonableness in tort law. If a 
straightforward analysis of income and expenses is what Congress 
envisioned, it could have easily included a formula in the Bankruptcy 
Code itself that expressly outlined a student debtor’s necessary income 
and expense ratio to support an undue hardship exception.117 Instead, it 
chose to leave the term undefined, subject to the court’s varied 
interpretations. Furthermore, there is no reason to provide predictability 
to debtors in this context. The “undue hardship” exception is not a 
bankruptcy planning device but rather a situation that Congress believed 
should override the general presumption of nondischargeability because 
it constitutes an unexpected and unfortunate turn of events.118 
The next question is whether the “minimal living standard” is a more 
appropriate standard than the strict poverty line standard. In other words, 
should debtors have to be utterly impoverished to be eligible for 
discharge? The text of § 523(a)(8) states that the debt should not be 
discharged “unless excepting such debt . . . would impose an undue 
hardship.”119 Importantly, an inquiry into the poverty level is not 
necessarily determinative of whether an undue hardship exists. One 
could conceive of a situation in which a debtor has an income below the 
poverty line, but lived in such conditions that payment of the debt would 
not be an “undue hardship,” depending on the amount of the debt.  
More likely, however, is the situation where a recent graduate above 
the poverty level nonetheless faces undue hardship in meeting her loan 
obligations. For instance, if a debtor has an apartment in a large city, 
where living expenses are high, and the debtor is carrying a heavy debt, 
one could conclude that such a situation constitutes undue hardship if the 
debtor’s income is only slightly or moderately above the poverty line. In 
these circumstances, the debtor should be entitled to a discharge even 
 
 114. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 106, at 197. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 197 n.82. 
 117. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), 707(b) (2006). Congress had no qualms about 
providing rigid formulaic calculations in the Code as part of the 2005 BAPCPA.  
 118. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 138 (1977). 
 119. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
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though her income is above the poverty line. Thus, the poverty line can 
become a poor and overly rigid indicator of “undue hardship.”  
The “additional circumstances” or “certainty of hopelessness” 
standard is an outgrowth of the minimal living standard, in that the 
additional circumstances test asks whether the debtor’s current financial 
condition will continue throughout the repayment period.120 In this way, 
the minimal living standard actually consists of two parts: an analysis of 
the current situation followed by an analysis of whether that situation 
will continue. In the Brunner test, the additional circumstances test is not 
dependent on the court’s findings under the good faith test discussed 
below.121  
But should this element be necessary for determining “undue 
hardship?” The answer is yes, because without consideration of 
“additional circumstances,” a debtor who anticipates inheriting a large 
sum of money, but who is unemployed (i.e., below the minimal living 
standard) would be able to qualify for an undue hardship discharge 
without having to show actual undue hardship, assuming that he has 
made good faith efforts to pay the debt. Thus, courts must consider, and 
even require, a continued inability to repay because of additional 
circumstances. The problem with the “additional circumstances” test is 
that the debtor faces a difficult task of producing sufficient evidence 
necessary to show such circumstances.122 Generally, even if the debtor 
succeeds in showing a current inability to repay, courts will not presume 
that such a financial condition will continue into the future, and so the 
burden remains on the debtor to prove additional circumstances.123 As a 
result, the court in the case of In re Nys reasoned that this rule would 
prevent a debtor from purposely choosing circumstances that prevent 
him or her from repaying.124 For these reasons, the “additional 
circumstances” element is responsible for incurring the most criticism of 
 
 120. In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).  
 121. See id. (“There is no specific authority for this requirement, but the need for some 
showing of this type may be inferred from comments of the Commission report.”).  
 122. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 106, at 198. 
 123. See In re Nys, 446 F.3d 938, 946 n.7 (9th Cir. 2006) (“By ‘additional circumstances’ or 
‘exceptional circumstances’ we mean only that the debtor must present something more than her 
current financial situation. In other words, she cannot rely on the fact that if she made payments now 
on her student loans, she would not be able to maintain a minimal standard of living. Rather, she 
must present the court with circumstances that she cannot reasonably change. To prove ‘undue 
hardship,’ the circumstances must indicate that the debtor cannot reasonably be expected to increase 
her income and make payments for a substantial portion of the loan’s repayment period.”). 
 124. Id. 
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the Brunner test.125 The primary problem with this test is that proving 
“additional circumstances” is highly difficult as it requires the production 
of expert testimony showing, for example, a physical or mental 
disability, incapacity to work for long periods of time, inability to stay 
committed to a single line of work, etc.126 The litigation costs for the 
debtor can accordingly skyrocket in trying to prove this one element.  
However, the main problem with the Brunner approach is that 
satisfying the first element, because it initially establishes that the 
debtor’s income is below the level needed to maintain a “minimal 
standard of living,” undermines the debtor’s ability to satisfy the second 
element. Thus, these two tests (the “minimal living standard” and the 
“additional circumstances” tests) are self-contradictory when applied, 
because satisfaction of the first element provides evidence that the debtor 
failed the second element. The first two elements of the Brunner test, 
therefore, have the effect of allowing discharge for only a few select 
debtors. When applied, the test allows fewer still. Although Congress 
intended only a few particular kinds of debtors to qualify for an “undue 
hardship” discharge, the rule in its application achieves this result in the 
wrong way. It essentially means that if a student debtor’s “additional 
circumstances” happen to be psychological in nature, as opposed to 
something more easily provable such as permanent paralysis, then by this 
fact alone the psychologically impaired debtor will generally receive 
harsher treatment.127 Congress intended the results to be harsh, not 
arbitrary and capricious, and so courts should use a different test that 
avoids this problem. 
The simplest way to avoid the self-contradiction of these first two 
prongs would be to shift the burden of proof of “additional 
circumstances” to the bankruptcy trustee, or whoever is claiming that the 
student debt should not be discharged. If the debtor is able to show that 
his current situation is such that he could not pay off the loan while 
maintaining a minimal standard of living, then the debtor should be 
entitled to a presumption that his situation will continue. This 
presumption could then be rebutted by a showing through a 
 
 125. See Smith, supra note 6, at 615; Huey, supra note 5, at 115–18. 
 126. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 106, at 198–99 (citing In re Nys, 446 F.3d at 946).  
 127. Compare In re Daugherty, 175 B.R. 953, 959–60 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1994) (holding that 
the debtor was not entitled to a discharge because although she had mental and physical conditions 
creating substantial medical bills, the debtor failed to prove that her medical condition prevented her 
from working to repay the loan), with In re Hinkle, 200 B.R. 690, 693–94 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 
1996) (holding that a debtor whose expenses included medical bills was entitled to a discharge 
because she was an older woman with few prospects for increased earning capacity).  
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preponderance of the evidence that the debtor’s situation is likely to 
change, or that there are no “additional circumstances” that would 
prevent the debtor from being able to repay in the future. This would cast 
the responsibility of producing expensive expert testimony on the party 
that typically has the greater ability to fund the litigation, while at the 
same time avoiding the “draconian application” of Brunner.128 Making 
this change would provide a more equitable solution to the debtor’s 
situation. 
However, some argue that this solution does not solve the problem 
identified by the court in In re Nys, where a debtor could choose a 
lifestyle that would prevent her from repaying the debt.129 But with the 
third element of the Brunner test, this problem is avoided.130 If a debtor 
intentionally places himself in a situation where repayment becomes 
impossible, then the debtor would fail to show that he has made good 
faith efforts to repay the loan. Therefore, there is no reason why courts 
should not presume a future inability to repay when the debtor succeeds 
in showing both a good faith effort and a current inability to repay. 
Consequently, courts should keep the “minimal standard of living” test, 
but the debtor should not have the burden of producing evidence, such as 
expert testimony, to prove that “additional circumstances” exist.  
Furthermore, one element that no court seems to have considered in 
this analysis is the element of reasonable foreseeability. In the “undue 
hardship” analysis, congressional intent almost begs the courts to ask 
whether the current predicament of the debtor is a situation that the 
debtor should have reasonably foreseen before acquiring the loan. If it 
was, then the debtor should be held responsible for the risk of his 
decision. Of course, arguably all students enter into a program with the 
hopes of at least a moderate income and, in that way, almost never 
foresee the risk. Conversely, mere foreseeability may allow courts to 
include too many student debtors since attending college is no guarantee 
of any employment. Hence, courts might ask whether, under the debtor’s 
circumstances, there was any foreseeable way the debtor could have 
expected to repay the loan. If not, then the implication is that the student 
negligently assumed the debt without properly considering the risks 
involved. In one other section of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress 
provides a path to discharge if the “debtor’s failure to complete such 
 
 128. See Huey, supra note 5, at 115–16. 
 129. In re Nys, 446 F.3d at 946. 
 130. See discussion infra Part IV.B.  
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payments is due to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly 
be held accountable.”131 This provision has been informally nicknamed 
the “hardship discharge” in Chapter 13 cases.132 This may be why the 
Brunner court noted that Congress intended not a “garden-variety 
‘hardship,’”133 but a hardship that was unexpected. 
B. Good Faith Effort to Repay 
The good faith standard is a necessary element for undue hardship 
analysis, but it can also serve the additional purpose of assessing the 
“additional circumstances” requirement. In the previous section, it was 
shown that the “additional circumstances” test produces unfair results 
when applied in many situations. The good faith standard is an indirect 
way of assessing those “additional circumstances” without expressly 
testing them and therefore requiring the debtor to produce the necessary 
evidence to prove such “additional circumstances.” Take, for instance, 
Debbie Debtor, a recent graduate of law school. She has incurred 
$130,000 of educational loans but was involved in an accident where she 
suffered a head injury that prevents her from concentrating for any 
significant amount of time. She also now suffers from migraine 
headaches that further prevent prolonged concentration. While she was 
able to secure a job with a small law firm for a few months, it became 
clear that she would not be able to last there because of her physical 
condition. Under the “additional circumstances” test, Debbie would have 
to prove that her condition prevents her from working, possibly requiring 
the production of a doctor’s testimony, in addition to lay witnesses from 
the law firm who can testify to Debbie’s condition. The litigation process 
would likely involve substantial discovery and a lengthy trial, even 
though Debbie has no way to pay the legal fees.  
The good faith standard requires only two things of Debbie. First, 
she must use her efforts to maximize her income and minimize expenses. 
Likely, she will apply for other jobs, send out resumes, and possibly 
obtain employment in a less demanding field. But at the end of the day, 
she will only have to produce the applications she has sent to prospective 
employers, along with a financial statement of her income and expenses. 
All the court needs to ask is, “Did Debbie make a good faith effort to 
maximize employment, including finding employment, and minimize 
 
 131. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(1) (2006). 
 132. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 430–431 (1977). 
 133. In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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expenses?” Under these facts, the court should grant her a discharge for 
“undue hardship.” The fact that she has made diligent efforts to apply for 
employment and has been unable to hold a job because of her condition 
is an indirect way of showing that she will probably not be able to find 
the kind of employment that will allow her to pay off such a large debt. 
The good faith standard would also encompass all possible methods that 
Debbie could use to defer, adjust, consolidate, or otherwise modify the 
debt outside of bankruptcy. Because of the extensive programs under 
federal law that allow debtors to deal with overbearing debt, the debtor 
should have the duty to seek out all possible remedies before resorting to 
bankruptcy.  
Recall that remedies such as an income-contingent repayment plan 
may exist outside of bankruptcy. Creditors have argued that if the debtor 
has not applied for such a program, this could be grounds for a finding 
that the debtor has not made good faith efforts to repay the loan.134 
Collier on Bankruptcy states, however, that “[t]hese arguments overstate 
the role that an income-contingent repayment plan should play in 
determining dischargeability.”135 In other words, the fact that the debtor 
has other options, such as an income-contingent repayment plan, should 
not be a per se basis for a finding that the debtor has failed to make good 
faith efforts to repay the loan as it could unfairly prejudice the debtor.136 
The reason this prejudice may exist is that the debtor would have to be 
below the poverty line in order to qualify for the income-contingent 
repayment plan, which is a different and harsher requirement than the 
“minimal living standard” test.137 Therefore, as a rule, the fact that the 
debtor has failed to take advantage of an income-contingent repayment 
plan should only be a factor in this analysis and not determinative.138 
C. Motivation Standard 
To review, the motivation standard requires the court to ask whether 
the debtor’s purpose in filing bankruptcy was primarily to eliminate his 
 
 134. See Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 292 B.R. 635 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003). 
 135. 4-523 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.14 (3d ed. Rev. 2011) (“The U.S. Department of 
Education regulations provide that under an income-contingent repayment plan, a debtor is obliged 
to make some payment once the debtor's income exceeds the federal poverty level. However, the 
federal poverty level is below a ‘minimal’ standard of living.”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id.  
 138. See id. (“Courts must also be careful not to treat the enactment of the statute authorizing 
the U.S. Department of Education to accept an income-contingent repayment plan as an implied 
repeal of section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
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student debt. This standard is therefore logically inconsistent with the 
bankruptcy system as explained by the court in In re Bryant. That court 
correctly reasoned that the main purpose of debtors in bankruptcy is to 
eliminate debt. Thus, it should not be a surprise that a student might race 
to the bankruptcy court to rid himself of a large educational loan. As a 
result, the only time this standard will be utilized is if a bankruptcy 
trustee or the government could prove that the debtor had the actual 
intention of declaring bankruptcy before his situation became dire. 
Because this situation is extraordinarily rare, as a general rule, the 
motivation standard is often irrelevant.  
D. Totality of the Circumstances 
As the name suggests, a true “totality of the circumstances test” 
inherently contemplates a potentially infinite number of factors that 
could affect a student debtor’s ability to repay a debt.139 There are many 
problems with this test as a result. First, it is overly broad. For example, 
one factor that should be dismissed from consideration in an “undue 
hardship” analysis is the value of the degree that the debtor holds.140 
Although the value of higher education is on the decline, the value of 
one’s degree should never come into undue hardship analysis because the 
kind of degree a debtor chooses to pursue is a conscious decision that the 
debtor makes before schooling begins. As a result, the debtor should be 
the one to bear the costs of her decision to enter a particular field with a 
certain amount of debt. This is particularly true when the specific field 
bears little promise of significant future earnings, or the program or 
school attended has not been accredited by the appropriate authority. 
Additionally, allowing more debtors to claim undue hardship 
because of an unprofitable degree may encourage more students to take 
on educational debt with the intention of relying on the safety net of 
 
 139. See Smith, supra note 6, at 632.  
 140. See id. The totality of the circumstances test proposed by Smith would include 
consideration of good faith filing. In one case applying the Johnson test, the court stated that the 
mechanical test should be applied, followed by a consideration of good faith,  
“including whether the debtor has made a bona fide attempt to repay the loan, and 
whether the debtor was negligent or irresponsible in conducting his financial affairs such 
that the debtor's misfortune is self-imposed and the conclusion drawn under the 
mechanical test should be altered. Lastly, if bad faith is found, there must be a 
presumption against discharge which can be rebutted only by finding that the debtor’s 
dominant reason for filing was not eradication of substantial student loans and that the 
debtor has not benefited financially from the education financed by the loan.”  
In re Briscoe, 16 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (emphasis added).  
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bankruptcy in the future. Granted, in 1997 the Bankruptcy Commission 
found that the likelihood of bankruptcy abuse by student debtors was 
small, concluding that § 523(a)(8) should be repealed.141 However, 
although individual student debtors may not flock to bankruptcy in large 
numbers after a repeal of the undue hardship exception, for-profit 
institutions may use the repeal of § 523(a)(8) to attract more students, 
encouraging them to take on enormous amounts of debt while assuring 
them that doing so bears minimal risk. The enrollment practices of for-
profit universities often are questionable at best, and fraudulent or highly 
deceptive at worst. In an undercover study, the GAO recently reported 
that enrollment officers at for-profit universities have often engaged in 
hard-sell sales and marketing techniques while withholding financial aid 
advice in order to push prospective students into enrollment.142 One 
representative told an undercover applicant that he should not worry 
about repaying his student loans because “no one will come after you if 
you don’t pay.”143 Another representative told an applicant that he 
personally had over $85,000 of student debt, but that he had no intention 
of repaying it.144 It seems likely that if the undue hardship exception is 
repealed or interpreted broadly to encompass a larger number of student 
debtors, for-profit institutions could capitalize on such a change in order 
to boost their enrollment as well as their tuition. This demonstrates that 
in the context of “undue hardship” analysis the courts should not 
consider all conceivable factors. 
The congressional intent behind § 523(a)(8) suggests that a narrow 
test should be used instead of a broad or all-encompassing test.145 In 
addition to the reasons previously listed, consider the text of § 523(a)(8) 
stating “undue hardship.” The court in Brunner correctly noted that 
Congress obviously did not contemplate a broad definition of “undue 
hardship,” but that the “existence of the adjective ‘undue’ indicates that 
Congress viewed garden-variety hardship as an insufficient excuse for a 
discharge of student loans.”146  
Finally, the test does not provide uniform results in the student 
 
 141. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 213–16 
(1997). 
 142. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES: 
UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND 
QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES 11–12 (2010).  
 143. Id. at 12.  
 144. Id. 
 145. See discussion supra Part II.C.  
 146. In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).  
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debtor context. The test is of course flexible, but this perceived benefit 
could end up being a curse rather than a blessing, as different courts 
would apply the test differently, leading to unpredictable and inconsistent 
results.147 “Under the current standard, however, courts may choose 
from a multitude of factors and apply any combination of them to a given 
case, which only adds to the ambiguity and complexity of determining 
what constitutes undue hardship.”148 In other words, even though a court 
is directed to consider all factors equally, the court may still take the 
Orwellian approach of treating some factors more equally than others. 
For instance, one court may treat a debtor’s situation differently by 
focusing more on the current and future ability to repay, while others 
may emphasize the good  
faith element. This varying treatment could lead to forum shopping, 
inconsistent results, and a lack of guidance to student debtors. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In light of the plain language and the congressional intent behind § 
523(a)(8), the Brunner test provides the best foundation for “undue 
hardship” analysis because it provides a simple and straightforward 
three-step analysis that is strict but predictable. However, the Brunner 
test should be modified so that the burden of proof regarding the 
“additional circumstances” is not on the debtor, but on the party claiming 
nondischargeability. This presumption can be overcome by a showing 
that the debtor’s situation could possibly change or is not permanent. But 
whatever test is used, it should be as strict as Congress originally 
intended it to be. It should not matter that Congress may have been 
motivated by a perceived rather than an actual abuse of the system. 
Perhaps the mere possibility of abuse is enough to warrant the differing 
treatment. Those who oppose  § 523(a)(8) will likely achieve their 
desired results more quickly if the bankruptcy courts adopt a draconian 
application of the “undue hardship” exception, thereby forcing Congress 
to deal with the results that follow.  
Moreover, there were and are rational policy considerations that 
support the continued application of § 523(a)(8), even in a strict form. 
The “fresh start” policy is not a constitutional requirement; rather it is 
merely a general framework that has emerged from the conglomeration 
of provisions that Congress has adopted over the years. Judges, as well as 
 
 147. Huey, supra note 5, at 108. 
 148. Frattini, supra note 109, at 566. 
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scholars in particular, must realize that there is more at stake than mere 
logical consistency. Relieving a debtor of student loans under the banner 
of “fresh start” is not the end of the analysis: someone is going to have to 
foot the bill, whether it is the taxpayers, fellow student borrowers, or the 
debtor who incurs the loss. 
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